ties and creates instability in the secondary market.
In India, introduction of book building mechanism of IPOs in 1998 aimed to reduce underpricing because in the book building mechanism, offer price of the issue is determined on the basis of market feedback. The present study on 227 book-built IPOs for the period of 2004 to 2009 found that the average underpricing during this period was 28 per cent while the maximum underpricing was around 242 per cent.
Thus underpricing of IPOs is still an issue of concern.
A business firm can raise capital both from the private and public sources. The private sources include relatives, banks, financial institutions, private placement, etc., for raising capital in any formdebt or equity or both. When a firm offers its shares to the public for the first time, it is called an Initial Public Offering (IPO). An issuing firm has many advantages of raising equity through an IPO which are not available if it raises equity through the private sources. The firm can raise a larger amount of equity, get listed on the stock exchange(s) which makes shares more liquid through trading in the secondary capital market, and the listed stock can be used for merger and acquisition deals. Moreover IPOs pave a way for seasoned or follow on offerings. These advantages of IPOs over the other sources of capital make it very attractive for the business firms.
There are two types of costs incurred by the firm which chooses IPOs for raising funds. While the direct costs are printing, accounting, auditing expenses, and legal and underwriting fees, the indirect costs are dilution of the existing ownership, time taken in the issue process, disclosure of the financial and other information to the stock exchange(s), pressure of maximizing shareholders' wealth, and underpricing of IPO. When the offer price of IPO shares is less than the equilibrium price (true value) of the shares on the listing day, it is called underpricing of IPO. The degree of underpricing may differ for different IPOs. It is a cost of raising the funds for the firm because the firm gets less amount of capital than it would have got as per the worth of the shares (reflected in closing price of the issue on the listing day). Therefore the amount of underpricing of IPOs is the money left on the table by the issuers.
It has been found that the IPOs are underpriced in most of the countries (Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist, 1994) . It is in fact a serious problem for an economy. On the one hand, the tendency of high underpricing in the primary market discourages IPOs issued by those companies which cannot afford or do not want underpricing or to leave money on the table. On the other hand, it creates arbitrage activities in the secondary and grey market. Underpricing of IPOs thus hampers the growth opportunities and creates instability in the secondary market. There are many theoretical explanations to underpricing, which has been a favourite topic of empirical research for academics across the world. It is expected that this study would help to predict the underpricing of an IPO on the basis of different variables which will help in explaining the underpricing of IPOs in India. This is an empirical study on underpricing of IPOs listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) through book-building mechanism. It was found that the average and the maximum underpricing in the Indian capital market during the study period Act, 1947 , the pricing of new issues was totally controlled by the Controller of Capital Issue (CCI) and the quality of disclosure was very poor. Under the SEBI regulations, issuers are free to determine the issue price. Before 1995, only the fixed price method of pricing was allowed for IPOs. However, it faced two drawbacks: (1) Uncertainty about the time taken in completion of the issue process; (2) High underpricing of the issue. Therefore, on the recommendations of the Malegam Committee, in October, 1995, SEBI recognized the book building mechanism of price discovery. The book-building process has many advantages over the fixed price mechanism of pricing the IPOs, the biggest advantage being that it includes market perception about the firm value in the price determination. Therefore, in most of the countries, IPOs are issued through the book-building mechanism of pricing. Through book-building, the IPOs are issued in a price band of not more than 20 per cent (as per SEBI guidelines) and for a period (maximum 13 days) in which the applicants bid for the issue and after closing of the issue, a final price (called as the market clearing price) is determined on the basis of the demand received through the applicants' bids. This final price is the offer price of the issue.
LITERATURE REVIEW Theoretical Arguments on Underpricing of IPOs
The Underwriter's Monospony Power Hypothesis: Baron (1982) explains two reasons of underpricing of IPOs. One is the information asymmetry between issuer and the investment banker. An investment banker knows better about the capital market than the issuer. Therefore the issuer offers incentive to investment banker with the price which is lower than the first best offer price, for revealing its superior information about the capital market. This lower price is an incentive for the investment banker who can sell the issue easily. Thus information asymmetry between the issuer and the banker causes underpricing of new issue. Another reason for underpricing of IPOs is that the issuers are more uncertain about the market demand of the unseasoned issue than for the seasoned issue. Therefore their need for investment bankers' information about the market condition increases in the new issues and hence the issuers' willingness to accept underpricing for new issues is high.
Winner's Curse Hypothesis: Rock (1986) argues that the reason of underpricing is information asymmetry between investors in the IPO market. There are two types of investors: informed and uninformed. Informed investors always subscribe to underpriced issues while uninformed investors get those issues which are not demanded by the informed investors, i.e., overpriced issues.
Therefore to tempt uninformed investors to subscribe to all IPOs, an underpricing is required, which is a compensation for getting allocated in overpriced issues.
This model implies that the information asymmetry among the investors is the main reason for underpricing. In India, book building information is freely available on the stock exchange website, on daily basis during the book built period. So, uninformed investors can see the subscription of informed investors (who have more knowledge about future prospects of the firm) and follow their decisions. Therefore book building information reduces the information asymmetry among the investors in India.
Signalling Hypothesis: Allen and Faulhaber (1989) explain that underpricing is a signal of good quality firm because low value firms cannot afford underpricing. Therefore to signal the high value of the firm, issuer underprices the issue. The high value firm returns back for seasoned offerings and recovers the money left in the underpriced new issue.
Costly Information Acquisition Hypothesis: Benveniste and Spindt (1989) argue that underpricing is a natural consequence of the premarket auction, in which investors reveal their interest in the issue. For revealing the interest, the underwriter gives incentive to the investors in terms of underpricing. The issue that arises then is: Why can't an issuing firm itself collect premarket indications of interest without employing an underwriter? The argument given is that the investment banker can bring higher proceeds from the regular clients. Investment Banker's Reputation Hypothesis: Carter and Manaster (1990) conclude that the underwriter's reputation is negatively related to underpricing. Underpricing is injurious to the issuing firm; therefore low-risk firms want to reveal their quality by selecting prestigious underwriters and the prestigious underwriters always select low-risk firms in order to maintain their market reputation. Therefore issues marketed by prestigious underwriters will always have lower underpricing.
Cascades Hypothesis: Welch (1992) explains that issuer underprices the issue in order to motivate the first few potential investors to purchase, which cascade positive information about the issue, because later investors completely rely on the earlier investors for subscribing to any issue. Thus underpricing of an issue, particularly when it is sold sequentially, would persuade the earlier investors and thereby later investors would take purchase decisions by following them.
Stabilization Hypothesis: Ruud (1993) finds that IPO underpricing is the result of underwriter's price support until the issue is fully sold. Brennan and Franks (1997) study 69 IPOs in the UK and find that underpricing is to ensure oversubscription; and therefore, rationing in the share allocation process is unfavourable to large applicants and in favour of small applicants to reduce control in the hands of outsiders.
Reduced Monitoring Hypothesis:

Implicit Insurance against Legal Liabilities Hypothesis:
Tinic (1988) studies 70 IPOs during pre-SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) and 134 IPOs during 1966 -1971 and finds that underpricing is higher in post-SEC period because legal liabilities against investment banker and issuer has increased after SEC; therefore underpricing or higher initial return has turned into implicit insurance against possible damages due to legal actions by SEC. According to SEC, the maximum recoverable limit is offer price; therefore, a lower offer price makes an insurance against any post-issue legal liability.
EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON UNDERPRICING OF IPOs
Underpricing of IPOs has been reported in almost all equity markets and across time with a comparison of 45 countries (Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist, 1994) . Su (2004) argues that debt does not convey the positive signal of firm quality in China. Using the data of 283 Chinese IPOs, the author finds that larger the pre-IPO leverage, higher the degree of IPO underpricing. It is also observed that in China, underpricing is high for the issues having low promoters' stake. The reason attributed by the author is that larger insider ownership reduces the information asymmetry and therefore lowers the need to underprice. Thus this finding indicates that in China, underpricing is more for the firms which have larger pre-IPO leverage and low promoters' holding. The author has also found that age of the firm is not a significant variable of underpricing. The author measures market conditions by the accumulated 30-day stock market return and the standard deviation of returns. It is found that the degree of underpricing is relatively small when market conditions surrounding an IPO are favourable (i.e., the accumulated 30-day stock-market return is high while the standard deviation of returns is low).
In the Indian context, Nandha and Sawyer (2002) study 261 par and 120 premium issues, over the financial year 1994-95 and find that the higher promoters' holding leads to higher initial returns because higher promoters' stake reduces the ex-ante uncertainty. Therefore pricing of IPOs on the listing day is high. This finding of the Indian Capital Market is in contradiction with the finding of the Chinese capital market (Su, 2004) . This finding indicates that in India, higher value firms (firms which have less ex-ante uncertainty) are more underpriced. However, this finding is based on the sample of fixed price issues; therefore the present study examines the promoters' holding in book built issues. Ghosh (2005) finds underpricing in India for over a decade (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) , uncertainty playing a significant role in the underpricing. He finds time lag (number of days between offer closing day and listing day) as a significant determinant of underpricing, since the information about the issue which is disseminated during time lag is not available at the time of offering of the issue. The larger the listing delays, the higher the underpricing. The study suggests reducing information asymmetry by improving offer document contents and reducing the delay between the offer closing day and the listing day. The author has also found that age of the firm is not a significant variable of underpricing while size is a significant variable of underpricing, the larger issues were less underpriced. It is assumed that larger issues go with more regulatory compliance and attention in comparison to the smaller issues and therefore risk for larger issues is less, resulting in lower underpricing for larger issues. The study also finds that in hot market (high market return period), underpricing is less because investors are optimistic and hence the firms do not need to underprice for attracting the investors. The study is based on fixed price and book-built IPOs; it has not taken a separate analysis of book-built and fixed-price IPOs. The present study therefore examines the listing delay only in book built issues.
In the Indian context, Ranjan and Madhusoodanan (2004) study underpricing for a sample of 92 IPOs listed on NSE and BSE during January 1999-November 2003. They have found that on average money left by fixed price route is 38 per cent while through book building route, it is 6 per cent. The aggegated Indian IPOs in this period has left 17 per cent money on the table. Kumar (2007) finds underpricing of 27 per cent for a sample of 156 book-built IPOs during 1999-2006. The author assumes that the larger issues are less risky because they are analysed by many analysts; therefore for larger issues, underpricing is less, but the regression coefficient is insignificant. It has also been assumed that good market conditions create unmet demand of the issue and therefore the underpricing is high, though regression coefficient of the market condition is insignificant. The author finds that around 81 per cent of IPO underpricing is explained by the return on opening price, which is therefore considered as the major determinant of underpricing. But the proper implication and explanation for the finding is not provided in the paper. Therefore the present study takes the return on opening as a study variable to provide the underlying implication and to re-examine the finding in a different study period. Shelly and Singh (2008) study 1,963 fixed price IPOs listed on BSE during July 1992-August 2006 and find that on an average, IPOs are underpriced by around 70 per cent. In fixed price IPOs, larger IPOs are found to be less underpriced and old firms are underpriced less than the young firms. The study also finds subscription to be positively related to the underpricing in the fixed price issues. Therefore we take subscription as a proxy for demand of the issue in the book-built offerings.
Thus underpricing of IPOs has been a topic of continuous research among the academics. They have found many reasons behind underpricing of IPOs. In an attempt to fill the gap found in the literature on the Indian capital market, this study examines whether underpricing is more by the high value firms or the low value firms. On one side, while it examines the theoretical argument, on the other side, it is expected to be helpful to the practitioners in predicting the pricing of IPOs based on the value of firm and some other factors that come out as empirically significant in the study.
SAMPLE AND DATA
The sample size is 227 book-built IPOs during the period March 2004 to August 2009. In the study period, the total number of IPOs is 305, out of which 227 IPOs were selected for the study. The selection of IPOs is based on data availability. The IPOs which are listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) were taken for the study The data relating to issue price, closing price on the listing day, the year of listing, the date of listing, the date of offer closing, the closing SENSEX on the offer closing day, the closing SENSEX on the listing day, and the opening price on the listing day are collected from the website of the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). The data on 30-day index returns (Index is SENSEX) before the date of offer opening and 30-day index volatility before the date of offer opening, were obtained from the PROWESS, a data base compiled by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), which contains data for more than 10,000 Indian companies.
The data regarding the year of incorporation, the total assets and the total loan, the promoters' holding, and the issue size were obtained from the Prospectus. Prospectus is an offer document which is filed with the Registrar of Companies (ROC) after the closure of the issue in case of book-building offerings and before the issue opens in case of fixed price offerings. These prospectuses are available on the website of Securities and Exchange Board of India Limited (SEBI). The data on subscription was taken from the "Basis of Allotment" documents, which are prepared by the Registrar of the issue.
THE MODEL
This model tries to find out the relationship between the value of firm and underpricing and also explores the factors causing underpricing. It takes the variables which measure firm value and other factors which are expected to cause underpricing in the equilibrium. These variables are as follows:
Age of the firm
Age of the firm is the period from the incorporation date to the listing date of the firm. As asserted in Ghosh (2005) , we also assume that an older firm can provide longer operating history than a new firm; hence investors can have more trust in the performance of an older firm, which in turn reduces the risk and signals a high value of the firm.
Pre-IPO Leverage Modigliani and Miller (1958) state that in equilibrium, leverage does not affect the value of the firm. They measure the market value of the firm as the sum of the market value of debt and the market value of equity. The levered and unlevered firms in the same risk class with the same expected return are of the same market value in the equilibrium. If the market value is different for levered and unlevered firms, then arbitrage will take place. In the arbitrage process, the demand of the undervalued firm's shares increases and therefore the share price of the undervalued firm moves up and the over-valued firm's share price goes down due to selling pressure, thereby making the value of these two firms equal in the equilibrium. The arbitrage is possible between these two types of firms (levered and unlevered), since investors can make their own personal levered portfolio for unlevered firm by borrowing as well as undoing the leverage of the levered firm by lending, However, Modigliani and Miller (1963) have revised their proposition which states that debt does not affect the value of the firm. The authors argue that the interest payments on debt are tax deductible; therefore, the value of the firm (after tax income) increases with the increase in the proportion of debt in the firm's capital structure. Therefore high leverage increases the market value of the firm. Ross (1977) has responded to the above proposition that debt increases value of the firm. The author argues that the optimal level of debt in the capital structure has a trade-off between the benefits of tax and the increased cost of financial distress or bankruptcy. Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that when debt increases, the agency cost of debt also increases. The agency costs contain the incentives offered by the owners to managers to work out of the personal interest and the monitoring costs by the bondholders to monitor the actions of the managers. The agency costs arise due to the conflicts between interests of the owner(s), bondholders, and lenders. The authors state that at the optimal level of debt, tax benefits of debt is just equal to the agency costs and bankruptcy cost of the debt. Myers and Majluf (1984) have developed a model of capital structure in which highly profitable firm has a lower debt because it has enough earnings to finance investment opportunities.
On the basis of capital structure theories, it can be inferred that high pre-IPO leverage indicates high financial distress costs, high agency cost, and also that the firm is not having enough internal financing or profit. Therefore this paper assumes that the value of the highly levered firm is low at the time of IPO. In the model, Pre-IPO leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets of the firm. (the latest figure given in the offer document was taken). As per the capital structure theory, high pre-IPO leverage indicates high financial distress costs, agency costs, and lower profitability; therefore high pre-IPO leverage increases the risk and thereby decreases the firm value. The model assumes the age of the firm and the pre-IPO leverage as proxies of the firm value in the market.
Promoters' Holding in Post-issue Equity
Promoters' holding is a fraction of the total post-issue equity held by the promoters (including promoters' group). Leland and Pyle (1977) explain that this retention ratio shows the issuer's willingness in her project and conveys information about the expected future cash flows of the firm. Therefore higher shareholding by the issuer conveys high value of the firm. Allen and Faulhaber (1989) assume that the high value firm keeps more with them because they come in the seasoned equity offerings.
In India, as per the SEBI rules, 20 per cent of the postissue equity is mandatory to be held by the promoters of the issuing company, which has a lock-in period of three years and the equity held for more than the minimum requirement has a lock-in period of one year. In the sample data, the minimum, average, and minimum promoters' holding is around 23 per cent, 60 per cent, and 95 per cent of the post-issue equity.
Considering these specific regulatory compliances, in India, the present model takes promoters' holding as a proxy for liquidity of the issue in the secondary market. If the promoters' holding is high, it has less liquidity because promoters' holding is the subject of lock-in of one year. If the promoters' holding is lower, then the issue has higher liquidity. Therefore IPO firms which are having high promoters' holding (low liquidity) are expected to underprice more to attract the investors.
Issue Size
Issue size was taken as the total number of shares issued in the IPO. Ghosh (2005) and Kumar (2007) assume the issue size as a measure of ex-ante uncertainty as larger issues are subject to regulatory attention and analysed by many analysts; therefore they are lesser risky, and so, underpricing is low for larger issues. The model takes issue size as a proxy of supply of the issued shares. The larger issue size increases the supply; therefore in equilibrium, the price remains lower.
Market Condition
The two different findings -one of Su (2004), where good market condition leads to lower underpricing be-cause good market does not need discount to the investors in terms of underpricing, and the other of Kumar (2007) , where good market condition leads to higher underpricing (the reason attributed is high unmet demand) -motivate us to re-examine the market conditions in the Indian IPO market. Therefore the present study takes the index return and index volatility of 30 days before the IPO opening, as a proxy for market condition. If the market return is high, then it shows good market condition and if the index volatility is high, then it shows high uncertainty in the market and vice versa.
Subscription
It is the number of shares applied for divided by the number of shares offered. Shelly and Singh (2008) study subscription in the fixed price IPOs and find them to be significant. Therefore the present study aims to examine it in book-built IPOs.
The present model assumes subscription to be a proxy for demand of the issue. A high subscription shows high demand of the issue. This signal is available to investors only; hence if they see that the subscription is high (demand), they value the issue more (in terms of high closing price on the listing day) than the valuation done by the firm (in terms of offer price). Therefore for a high demand, the underpricing is high because it increases the difference between closing price on the listing day and offer price.
Listing Delay
Listing delay is the number of days between offer closing day and listing day. Ghosh (2005) argues that as listing delay increases, underpricing increases, since the information about the issue is disseminated during this period which is not available at the time of subscription of the issue. Therefore, we also assume a positive relationship between listing delay and underpricing.
Return on Opening
Kumar (2007) finds return on opening as a significant variable of underpricing but the return on opening is not adjusted for market return. Therefore to get the net effect of return on opening, the present study uses market-adjusted return on opening (MAROP). MAROP is the return on opening price over the offer price after adjusting for the market return. We take return on opening as a proxy for investors' willingness to pay. As in book-building mechanism of pricing, investors get the chance to price the issue in a price band only which has the maximum difference of 20 per cent between cap and floor price. For example, if the floor price (minimum price) is Rs. 100, then the cap price (maximum price) is Rs 120. Therefore investors' willingness to pay high or low for an issue is reflected in the opening price on the listing day. If the return on opening is positive, it indicates that investors are willing to pay more than the offer price. Therefore, the share price in the equilibrium (closing price on the listing day) increases which results in higher underpricing. If return on opening is negative, it shows that investors are willing to pay less than the offer price. If it is zero, it means investors are willing to pay equal to the offer price.
Market Adjusted Return on opening (MAROP) = [{OP
where, OP 1 = Listing price or Opening price on the listing day, OP 0 = Offer price.
OS 1 = Opening SENSEX on the listing day, OS 0 = Opening SENSEX on the offer closing day
The above explained independent variables can be seen at a glance in Table 2 . The table shows signals given by the independent variables. 
Underpricing
The closing price of the share on the listing day represents the equilibrium price. Equilibrium price is the price determined by the demand and supply forces of the market. On the listing day, the whole day demand and supply forces work and then closing price reflects the equilibrium brought by these forces. Therefore, in literature, Ghosh (2005) , Kumar (2007) , and Shelly and Singh (2008) consider it as the true value of the listed share. Underpricing is the initial returns for investors.
Where, CP 1 = Closing price on the listing day; OP 0 = Offer price of the share These returns after adjusting with the market returns are taken as the market adjusted initial return (MAIR) as a measure of the underpricing.
Underpricing or MAIR = Initial Return -Market Return.
Where, CS 1 = Closing index on the listing day, CS 0 = Closing index on the offer closing day.
The Model
To achieve the objectives of the study, we take ln underpricing as a dependent variable and Age of the firm, ln Issue Size, Pre-IPO Leverage, Promoters' Holding, Index Return, ln IndexVolatility, ln Suscription, ln Listing Delay, ln MAROP as independent variables for the regression model.
ln Underpricing = β 0 + β 1 ln (Age) + β 2 ln (Issue Size) + β 3 (Pre-IPO Leverage) + β 4 (Promoters' Holding) + β 5 (Index Return) + β 6 (Index Volatility) + β 7 ln (Subscription) + β 8 (Listing Delay) + β 9 ln (MAROP) + εi Due to high correlation between the independent variables, ln subscription and ln MARO (for correlation among variables, refer to Table 6 in the Annexure), stepwise regression (which considers partial correlation between dependent and independent variables) was taken into consideration to find the best model. For the purpose of normality in the used variables, the dependent variable and most of the independent variables are taken in natural logarithm form (Table 5( 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity does not reject the null hypothesis of constant variance at 5% level of significance. This indicates constancy of the residuals (homoscedasticity) in the set of significant independent variables. Table 3 shows the results of stepwise regression. Model 4 is the best model with the highest explanatory power (R-square 48.3% in Table 4 ). Model 4 indicates that the underpricing (MAIR) depends on the return on opening, index volatility, subscription, and the Pre-IPO leverage. In equilibrium, the variables issue size, age, listing delay, and promoters' holding and index return are not significant. The positive sign of the regression coefficient for MAROP implies that as return on opening increases (investors willingness to pay), the underpricing increases because high return on opening increases the difference between the pricing of the issue by the firm (price band) and pricing by the investors (opening price on listing). The negative sign of coefficient for leverage is inconsistent to international evidence (Su, 2004) . As per the capital structure theories, we assumed that low pre-IPO leverage firms are high value firms. Therefore negative coefficient for leverage indicates that IPOs of high value firms (low leverage firms) are more underpriced. The reason for the difference between the findings of the Indian and the Chinese capital markets can be attributed to the different conditions of capital markets in the two countries. The positive regression coefficient for subscription indicates that as subscription increases underpricing increases because high subscription indicates high demand which leads to high value of the issued share or firm and thereby the large difference between the offer price and the closing price on the listing day. The result is consistent with Shelly and Singh (2008) , who found subscription as a significant variable of underpricing for fixed price IPOs. As index volatility also has a positive impact on underpricing, high market volatility increases the risk in the market; therefore the firms need to underprice to attract investors. This finding is similar to the finding of the Chinese capital market (Su, 2004) .
Test for Heteroskedasticity
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity
Ho: Constant variance Variables: lnsubscription lnindexvolatility lnmaro leverage chi 2 (4) = 8.56 Prob > chi 2 = 0.0731
Thus the findings of the present study support the Signalling Hypothesis of Allen and Faulhaber (1989) , emphasizing that the high value or high quality firm underprices more than the low value or low quality firm because the latter cannot afford underpricing. The findings of the study indicate that the underpricing increases with significant variables like high return on opening, low pre-IPO leverage, and high subscription. All these variables signal high value of the firm in the market. It can now be stated that in Indian capital market, high value firms underprice more for signaling their high value to the investors. Investors take underpricing as a signal of high value because a low value firm cannot afford leaving money on the table or underpricing. Table 4 shows that in Model 4, return on opening, index volatility, subscription, and the pre-IPO leverage together explain 48 per cent of the market adjusted initial return or IPO underpricing. Thus in the Indian capital market, underpricing of IPOs is the result of the investors' high willingness to pay (High MARO), the demand of the issue (high subscription), firm value (low pre-IPO leverage), and the prevailing market conditions (high index volatility).
The earlier studies of the Indian capital market have not considered any relationship between leverage and underpricing. Moreover, in the present study, variables, viz., return on opening, subscription, and market conditions are explained properly, which were missing in the earlier studies. In the sample data, the maximum return on opening is around 96 per cent and the average is 22 per cent, the maximum pre-IPO leverage is around 89 per cent and the average is 32 per cent, and the maximum subscription is around 160 times of the offered shares and the average is 24 times. (see Table 5 (a) in the Annexure). Table 5 (b) in the Annexure shows descriptive statistics of the variables transformed into natural logarithm. Table 6 gives the Bivariate correlation among the variables and Table 7 shows the significance of the models. We have considered Model 4 which is signifi- 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The study was aimed to do industry-wise analysis but BSE Website gives a large number of industries, which makes analysis difficult. In some industries, we could not find sufficient number of IPOs. Therefore, in future, an industry-wise analysis can be done by referring to the industry classification by some other source for better findings.
CONCLUSION
In the Indian capital market, IPOs are underpriced in book-building mechanism also which is the most accepted mechanism throughout the world for pricing of the new issues. The results of the empirical study indicate that underpricing is the result of investors' high willingness to pay (high return on opening), high demand of the issue (high subscription), high firm value (low pre-IPO leverage), and high fluctuations in the market returns (high index volatility). Results show that IPOs of high value firms (with lower Pre-IPO leverage) are more underpriced in India. Thus pre-IPO leverage gives a signal to the market. At the time of high-index volatility, underpricing is high; therefore during low index volatility, IPOs should be encouraged to reduce underpricing. And now further research can be carried out for finding out the reasons for high subscription and high return on opening. 
ANNEXURE
